A. PREAMBLE:
Now a days , real threat to IP cadre is multifarious frauds. Frauds in lakhs are common in all divisions. Fraudulent persons are developing confidence among the people. The innocent people give money to them without getting any documentary evidences. It results unrecoverable loss to the department and contributory negligence to the Inspectorial staff as well as operative staff.
B. FIRST THING TO DO is recovery, recovery and recovery only. Fraudulent persons should be handled softly. All ways and means should be adapted to recover the whole amount of loss. Nothing is wrong in giving false hopes like ‘police case will not be given if entire amount is recovered,' Minimum punishment will be given' and 'the same post will be given after enquiry' . Time gap should not be given for recovering the amount. Some anti-social elements will preach the fraudulent persons not to credit the amount stating that (1) if the amount is credited voluntarily, it will be taken as a documentary evidence against them (2) Even if the amount is credited, the employment will not be given by the Department (3) Even if the amount is credited, the police case will be given (4) If the amount is not credited into Government, the same will be utilized for meeting police case and court case. If the entire amount is recovered, the angle of investigation will be different and the course will not be more harsh.
C. MODUS OPERANDI
1. Suppression of SB/RD deposits and RPLI premiums:
Entries are made only in passbooks. The amount is not brought into postal accounts. There will be no entries in the departmental records such as SB/RD/RPLI journals and BO daily accounts. This type of frauds can be detected only by verification of passbooks with reference to SB/RD ledger balances and RPLI journals.
2. Suppression of RD MPKBY bulk lists and RD PRSS bulk lists:
Suppression of RD MPKBY agents’ lists and RD PRSS lists can be detected only by verification of agents’ copies of RD MPKBY agents lists and RD PRSS lists with office records. There is no use in verification of copies of MPKBY lists available in the office.
3. Forgery withdrawals/ fraudulent withdrawals:
Forgery withdrawals are made by preparing withdrawal forms by forging the signature of the depositors. Fraudulent withdrawals are made by withdrawals in which the signatures / LTIs were obtained previously from the actual depositors. There will be no entries in the passbooks but the amount will be charged into postal accounts. The amount will be taken by the fraudulent officials. Some fraudulent BPMs make entries in the passbooks in respect of forgery / fraudulent withdrawals and show the passbooks to the Mail overseers and Inspecting Officers for verification at the time of visits / inspections.
4. Change of denomination of RD accounts by using data entry;
If the denomination of RD account is Rs.10.00,it gives maturity value of Rs.600.00+ Rs.128.90 = Rs. 728.90. If the denomination is changed to Rs.1000/-using the data entry, it will give maturity value of Rs. 60000/-+12890/-= Rs.72890/-.The fraudulent SPM will obtain signatures in application side and acquittance side of withdrawal form in blank form and fill up with the inflated figures of Rs. 72890/-. The In-Charge of SBCO of a Head office is the correct authority to watch and report such kind of malpractice. In some Head Offices, RD transactions are not fed up-to-date in V2 software of SBCO branch. Use of the data entry should be permitted by the Divisional office for restricted period only. Unauthorized use of the data entry should be checked by the Inspectorial staff and by the DSMs.
D. HOW TO CONTROL FRAUDS IN BRANCH OFFICES?
1. (a) Lists of passbooks not received for entry of interest from the BOs should be prepared and two copies should be sent to the concerned Sub Divisional heads by registered post before 20th of July of every year vide Rule 75(1) (iii) of POSB Manual Volume I. The third copy is retained at Account office as office copy.
(b) A separate paragraph should be mentioned in BO IR whether the list of passbooks not received for entry of interest was received from the Account Office or not.
(c) During the inspection, four SB passbooks from the above list should be verified. If such passbooks cannot be verified, SB 46 notices should be issued for equal number of passbooks to be verified.
(d) If the list of SB passbooks not received of interest is not supplied by the Account Office, four SB passbooks which were not received for entry of interest should be verified.
(e) One copy of the above list should be given to the Mail overseer who will verify all SB passbooks in the list before the 31st March of the next year.
2. Maintenance of special error book:
(a) If any transaction is noticed by the SO, which have been found taken place at BO after the receipt of interest statement and the passbook has not been received, the SO should note the fact in the Special Error Book and a copy of the special error book should be sent to the Sub Divisional head vide Rule 76 (b) of POSB Manual Volume I and DG Posts Letter No.35-15/86-SB dated 27.03.2003.
(b) Fraudulent BPM will not send SB passbooks to Account Office for entry of interest since he committed fraud in these passbooks. Serious note should be taken when the passbooks are not sent for entry of interest when the transactions are taken place in these accounts.
3.Direct supervision by the Account Office:
(a) Account office should watch closely the work of the Branch Postmaster. If there is any correction or overwriting in the BAT in the pay-in-slip or withdrawal form, the passbook should be called for to verify the correct BAT. The corrections in the BO daily accounts should be brought to the notice of the Sub Divisional head. If the Account Office doubts the integrity of the Branch Postmaster, the same should be brought to the notice of the Sub Divisional head.
4. Direct supervision by the Mail overseer:
(a) Major part of the work of a Mail overseer is supervision of work of a Branch Office. Sub Divisional heads are saddled with so many targeted items of works where Mail overseer is concerned only with the supervision of Branch Offices. Sub Divisional heads spend few hours in the Branch offices and returned to the head quarters for attending some other works. Each Mail overseer can have 40 to 60 branch offices in his beat. Mail overseer can spare maximum eight hours in the Branch Offices checking all records and passbooks. Mail overseers should visit each BO once in quarter.
(b) Mail overseer should bring all irregularities found during the visit to the Sub Divisional heads such as shortage of cash, non-writing of BO accounts and non-writing of SB/RD journals. Mail overseer should not give oral warning to BPMs and it will not give any positive results.
(c) Mail overseer should verify heavy withdrawals more than Rs. 5000/- by obtaining passbooks from the depositors. There is no use in verifying SB journal of the Branch office. He should verify all heavy withdrawals since from his last visit and note down in his diary. When the heavy withdrawal memos are received subsequently he will furnish his verification report in the heavy withdrawal memos. He need not go the Branch Office for each heavy withdrawal memo.
(d) Mail overseer should take two copies of extracts of passbooks verified and send one for copy for verification at Head office in respect of SB accounts and to the Account office in respect of RD accounts. One copy is kept as office copy to be filed along with his diaries. If any difference is noticed in the balance of any account, action should be taken to send the passbooks to Account office for verification. Verified copy should be pasted over the office copy which is kept in the diary.
(d) Mail overseer should check BO accounts, SB/RD/RPLI journals and all receipt books since his last visit.
(e) Where there are two Mail overseers, their beats should be interchanged for every year.
(f) Mail overseer should enquire conduct and character of BPM with neighbouring Branch offices. If there is fraud in ten accounts out of five hundred accounts, it is tolerable. When there is fraud in hundred accounts, what is the use of the post of Mail overseer in a Sub Division?
5. Supervision by the Sub Divisional head:
(a) An office should be inspected within a year. If the office could not be inspected within a year, the reason for the delay should be noted in the Inspection Report as well as in the diary.
(b) Inspecting Officer should give more importance in respect of paragraphs relating to verification of passbooks than any other paragraphs. These paragraphs find important role in fixing contributory negligence when the amount could not be recovered from the delinquent BPMs.
(c) The following passbooks should be verified
(i) Four SB passbooks from the list of passbooks not received for entry of interest or four SB passbooks which were not received for entry of interest when the above list is not received.
(ii) Four other SB passbooks in which heavy deposits / withdrawals have been taken place.
(iii) Two current RD passbooks
(iv) Two discontinued RD passbooks
(v) Two TD passbooks
(vi) Five RPLI premium receipt books.
(d) If required number of passbooks could not be verified for any reason, SB 46 to the equal number of passbooks should be issued. SB 46 should be sent by the registered post and the RL receipts should be filed along with IR report.
(e) IR should be issued within 10 days from the date of inspection.
(f) As far as possible, stop gap arrangement in respect of BPMs, the incumbent should be changed once in two months.
(g) Any error book entries regarding SB branch matters and any information from the Account Office regarding integrity of the BPMs should not be ignored. It should be verified through Mail overseers.
E. HOW TO CONTROL FRAUDS IN SUB OFFICES?
I. FRAUDULENT USE OF DATA ENTRY:
(a) Fraudulent use of Data Entry is the main factor in the frauds of Sub Offices. Data Entry is available in many offices without authorisation of Divisional Office. DSMs should be instructed to install Data Entry for specific period. DSM should uninstall Data Entry as soon as the purpose is served. Inspecting Officer should check whether Data Entry is available and if so, the purpose for which Data Entry is kept.
Method to check whether Data Entry is available in the system
Click Start -> Search -> For Files & Folders
Select ‘Computer’ (or all the Drives viz., C:\, D:\, E:\ F:\ etc., may be searched)
Search “ *dataentv5.exe ”
If data entry packages available, then the result will be
sbdataentv5.exe
rddataentv5.exe
tddataentv5.exe
misdataentv5.exe
scsdataentv5.exe
ppfdataentv5.exe
nssdataentv5.exe
certdataentv5.exe
If data entry packages are not available, then the result will be
No items match your search.
(b) Now a days, the fraudulent SPMs made forgery / fraudulent part withdrawals in RD accounts. Normally number of part withdrawals in a sub office is five percent of total RD accounts. If there are a large number of part withdrawals in a year, it should be suspected.
Method to check particulars of part withdrawals within a period
Login →Counter or Super (Enter button must be used instead of mouse)
Reports → RD Reports → Accounting of loans
Please enter from date and to date and Click ‘OK’
Account number, amount and date of withdrawals will be shown in the screen for
the given period. If there is any abnormal number of withdrawals noticed, passbooks of high value denomination should be obtained and verified whether there are any part withdrawals in the RD passbooks.
(c) (i) Initially once works relating to the Data Entry is completed after computerization, List of balances should be taken and certified by the SPM. The signed copy should be forwarded to concerned SBCO. SBCO should do the ledger agreement for that SO. DE should be removed by DSM and it should not be installed / used once again at any cost.
(ii) The SPM should request the Divisional office for Data Entry stating the particulars of accounts to be modified and reason for such request. After getting written permission from the Divisional Office with period of permission, the DSM should install the Data Entry Module for that particular scheme.
(iii) A register in the following format should be maintained in all Computerised POs., which should be reviewed by the Sub Divisional Heads during inspections/visits.
Sl. No
Date
Scheme
Account No.
Nature of Problem
Rectified through DE on (date)
Rectified by (Name of the official)
Sign. of the official
Sign of SPM/ HPM
(iii)After completion of works for which Data Entry is given, the data entry module should be removed/un-installed by the DSM.
(iv) 100% completion of works relating to Data Entry is the only way to avoid frauds in a sub office.
(d) During the visit or inspection, the Inspecting Officer should check whether unauthorised Data Entry is available. If unauthorised Data Entry is available, the Data Entry should be deleted. If we ordinarily delete the file, it will go to ‘RECYCLE BIN’. The Data Entry can be used restoring from RECYCLE BIN, If we use ‘SHIFT + DELETE’, the file will be deleted without going to Recycle Bin.
(e) The register maintained for Data entry modifications should be critically reviewed by the Sub Divisional Heads w.r.t the written permission accorded by the Divisional Heads and the details of accounts modified / corrected.
II. Supervision by the Sub Divisional head and inspectorial staff:
(a) An office should be inspected within a year. If the office could not be inspected within a year, the reason for the delay should be noted in the Inspection Report as well as in the diary.
(b) Inspecting Officer should give more importance in respect of paragraphs relating to verification of passbooks than any other paragraphs. These paragraphs find important role in fixing contributory negligence when the amount could not be recovered from the delinquent SPMs.
(c) As per latest Sub Office questionnaire, the following passbooks should be verified in respect of single sub offices.
(i) Fifteen SB passbooks which were not received for entry of interest (ii) Ten TD passbooks.
(d) Inspectorial staff may verify the following passbooks in addition to the above passbooks.
(i) Ten SB passbooks in which heavy deposits /heavy withdrawals were
made.
(ii) Five RD current passbooks.
(iii) Five RD discontinued passbooks.
(iv) Five MIS passbooks
(v) Five RPLI premium receipt books.
(d) If required number of passbooks could not be verified for any reason, SB 46 to the equal number of passbooks should be issued. SB 46 should be sent by the registered post and the RL receipts should be filed along with IR report.
(e) IR should be issued within 15 days from the date of inspection.
For kind attention of OAs, Postal Divisional Office and concerned supervisor whether ASPOs (HQ) or ASPOs (OD):
When a Sub Postmaster commits a fraud, the Circle Level Investigation of the Region will analyse all lapses on the part of the Head office, Sub Divisional head and Divisional office. They will fix contributory negligence, if any lapses are noticed on the part of the OA Divisional office and concerned supervisor.
A. Review of Sub Postmaster’s Monthly Report (SMR):
The following points should be reviewed in respect of SMRs.
(1) SMR should be prepared in correct format of PA 17 (a). In the reverse side, the transactions of the current month and the transactions of corresponding month of the last year of in respect of each branch should be noted. If the decrease in the transactions of SB and RD deposits and increase in the withdrawals should be reviewed critically. If such irregularities are noticed, SMR should be sent to the Sub Divisional head for verification.
(2) Now a days, Sub office monthly reports are sent instead of SMRs. It does not contain the transactions of the corresponding month of the previous year. It should not be accepted. The SPM should be asked to send SMR in correct form PA 17(a).
(3) There should be specific remarks in the SMRs by the Head Postmaster whether ‘Satisfactory’ or Not satisfactory’. Serious note should be taken on the remarks of the Head Postmaster such as ‘Not satisfactory’. Such SMRs should be sent to the Sub Divisional heads without fail. Watch should be made in respect of SMRs sent for verification.
(4) Serial numbers of the ECB memos should be noted in the SMRs. Continuity of ECB serial numbers should be watched.
(5) Generally the fraudulent SPMs do not send SMRs. They know that if SMRs are sent, they will be caught. Non receipt of SMRs from a Sub Postmaster should be reviewed seriously. Non receipt of SMRs should be watched by a register maintained for the purpose.
The following points should be reviewed in respect of ECB (Excess Cash Balance) memos: .
(1) There should be specific remarks in the ECB memos by the Head Postmaster whether ‘Satisfactory’ or Not satisfactory’. Serious note should be taken on the remarks of the Head Postmaster such as ‘Not satisfactory’. Such ECB memos should be sent to the Sub Divisional heads without fail. Watch should be made in respect of ECB memos sent for verification.
(2) Break in the serial numbers should be watched by maintaining a register each page for a Sub Office. If the break in serials is noticed, the SPM concerned should be addressed to send the wanting ECB memos with copy to the Head Postmaster. All correspondence should be made by the registered post.
Reviews of SMRs and ECB memos are tools to bring out the frauds. Many frauds are being unearthed by such reviews.
The following points should be reviewed in respect of IR branch:
1. In respect of Inspection Reports having the remarks ‘Not satisfactory’, the concerned BO or SO should be ear-marked for second inspection. Second inspection should be carried out during the next half year.
2. Serious note should be taken in respect of IR/VR paras in respect of irregularities relating to Savings Bank matters. Such paras should be communicated to the Sub Divisional heads or to some other Inspectorial staff immediately. Periodical reminders should be made.
3. In some divisional offices, no office copy is maintained for outward correspondences. It is not correct. All correspondence should be made by registered post by keeping office copies.
Now a days , real threat to IP cadre is multifarious frauds. Frauds in lakhs are common in all divisions. Fraudulent persons are developing confidence among the people. The innocent people give money to them without getting any documentary evidences. It results unrecoverable loss to the department and contributory negligence to the Inspectorial staff as well as operative staff.
B. FIRST THING TO DO is recovery, recovery and recovery only. Fraudulent persons should be handled softly. All ways and means should be adapted to recover the whole amount of loss. Nothing is wrong in giving false hopes like ‘police case will not be given if entire amount is recovered,' Minimum punishment will be given' and 'the same post will be given after enquiry' . Time gap should not be given for recovering the amount. Some anti-social elements will preach the fraudulent persons not to credit the amount stating that (1) if the amount is credited voluntarily, it will be taken as a documentary evidence against them (2) Even if the amount is credited, the employment will not be given by the Department (3) Even if the amount is credited, the police case will be given (4) If the amount is not credited into Government, the same will be utilized for meeting police case and court case. If the entire amount is recovered, the angle of investigation will be different and the course will not be more harsh.
C. MODUS OPERANDI
1. Suppression of SB/RD deposits and RPLI premiums:
Entries are made only in passbooks. The amount is not brought into postal accounts. There will be no entries in the departmental records such as SB/RD/RPLI journals and BO daily accounts. This type of frauds can be detected only by verification of passbooks with reference to SB/RD ledger balances and RPLI journals.
2. Suppression of RD MPKBY bulk lists and RD PRSS bulk lists:
Suppression of RD MPKBY agents’ lists and RD PRSS lists can be detected only by verification of agents’ copies of RD MPKBY agents lists and RD PRSS lists with office records. There is no use in verification of copies of MPKBY lists available in the office.
3. Forgery withdrawals/ fraudulent withdrawals:
Forgery withdrawals are made by preparing withdrawal forms by forging the signature of the depositors. Fraudulent withdrawals are made by withdrawals in which the signatures / LTIs were obtained previously from the actual depositors. There will be no entries in the passbooks but the amount will be charged into postal accounts. The amount will be taken by the fraudulent officials. Some fraudulent BPMs make entries in the passbooks in respect of forgery / fraudulent withdrawals and show the passbooks to the Mail overseers and Inspecting Officers for verification at the time of visits / inspections.
4. Change of denomination of RD accounts by using data entry;
If the denomination of RD account is Rs.10.00,it gives maturity value of Rs.600.00+ Rs.128.90 = Rs. 728.90. If the denomination is changed to Rs.1000/-using the data entry, it will give maturity value of Rs. 60000/-+12890/-= Rs.72890/-.The fraudulent SPM will obtain signatures in application side and acquittance side of withdrawal form in blank form and fill up with the inflated figures of Rs. 72890/-. The In-Charge of SBCO of a Head office is the correct authority to watch and report such kind of malpractice. In some Head Offices, RD transactions are not fed up-to-date in V2 software of SBCO branch. Use of the data entry should be permitted by the Divisional office for restricted period only. Unauthorized use of the data entry should be checked by the Inspectorial staff and by the DSMs.
D. HOW TO CONTROL FRAUDS IN BRANCH OFFICES?
1. (a) Lists of passbooks not received for entry of interest from the BOs should be prepared and two copies should be sent to the concerned Sub Divisional heads by registered post before 20th of July of every year vide Rule 75(1) (iii) of POSB Manual Volume I. The third copy is retained at Account office as office copy.
(b) A separate paragraph should be mentioned in BO IR whether the list of passbooks not received for entry of interest was received from the Account Office or not.
(c) During the inspection, four SB passbooks from the above list should be verified. If such passbooks cannot be verified, SB 46 notices should be issued for equal number of passbooks to be verified.
(d) If the list of SB passbooks not received of interest is not supplied by the Account Office, four SB passbooks which were not received for entry of interest should be verified.
(e) One copy of the above list should be given to the Mail overseer who will verify all SB passbooks in the list before the 31st March of the next year.
2. Maintenance of special error book:
(a) If any transaction is noticed by the SO, which have been found taken place at BO after the receipt of interest statement and the passbook has not been received, the SO should note the fact in the Special Error Book and a copy of the special error book should be sent to the Sub Divisional head vide Rule 76 (b) of POSB Manual Volume I and DG Posts Letter No.35-15/86-SB dated 27.03.2003.
(b) Fraudulent BPM will not send SB passbooks to Account Office for entry of interest since he committed fraud in these passbooks. Serious note should be taken when the passbooks are not sent for entry of interest when the transactions are taken place in these accounts.
3.Direct supervision by the Account Office:
(a) Account office should watch closely the work of the Branch Postmaster. If there is any correction or overwriting in the BAT in the pay-in-slip or withdrawal form, the passbook should be called for to verify the correct BAT. The corrections in the BO daily accounts should be brought to the notice of the Sub Divisional head. If the Account Office doubts the integrity of the Branch Postmaster, the same should be brought to the notice of the Sub Divisional head.
4. Direct supervision by the Mail overseer:
(a) Major part of the work of a Mail overseer is supervision of work of a Branch Office. Sub Divisional heads are saddled with so many targeted items of works where Mail overseer is concerned only with the supervision of Branch Offices. Sub Divisional heads spend few hours in the Branch offices and returned to the head quarters for attending some other works. Each Mail overseer can have 40 to 60 branch offices in his beat. Mail overseer can spare maximum eight hours in the Branch Offices checking all records and passbooks. Mail overseers should visit each BO once in quarter.
(b) Mail overseer should bring all irregularities found during the visit to the Sub Divisional heads such as shortage of cash, non-writing of BO accounts and non-writing of SB/RD journals. Mail overseer should not give oral warning to BPMs and it will not give any positive results.
(c) Mail overseer should verify heavy withdrawals more than Rs. 5000/- by obtaining passbooks from the depositors. There is no use in verifying SB journal of the Branch office. He should verify all heavy withdrawals since from his last visit and note down in his diary. When the heavy withdrawal memos are received subsequently he will furnish his verification report in the heavy withdrawal memos. He need not go the Branch Office for each heavy withdrawal memo.
(d) Mail overseer should take two copies of extracts of passbooks verified and send one for copy for verification at Head office in respect of SB accounts and to the Account office in respect of RD accounts. One copy is kept as office copy to be filed along with his diaries. If any difference is noticed in the balance of any account, action should be taken to send the passbooks to Account office for verification. Verified copy should be pasted over the office copy which is kept in the diary.
(d) Mail overseer should check BO accounts, SB/RD/RPLI journals and all receipt books since his last visit.
(e) Where there are two Mail overseers, their beats should be interchanged for every year.
(f) Mail overseer should enquire conduct and character of BPM with neighbouring Branch offices. If there is fraud in ten accounts out of five hundred accounts, it is tolerable. When there is fraud in hundred accounts, what is the use of the post of Mail overseer in a Sub Division?
5. Supervision by the Sub Divisional head:
(a) An office should be inspected within a year. If the office could not be inspected within a year, the reason for the delay should be noted in the Inspection Report as well as in the diary.
(b) Inspecting Officer should give more importance in respect of paragraphs relating to verification of passbooks than any other paragraphs. These paragraphs find important role in fixing contributory negligence when the amount could not be recovered from the delinquent BPMs.
(c) The following passbooks should be verified
(i) Four SB passbooks from the list of passbooks not received for entry of interest or four SB passbooks which were not received for entry of interest when the above list is not received.
(ii) Four other SB passbooks in which heavy deposits / withdrawals have been taken place.
(iii) Two current RD passbooks
(iv) Two discontinued RD passbooks
(v) Two TD passbooks
(vi) Five RPLI premium receipt books.
(d) If required number of passbooks could not be verified for any reason, SB 46 to the equal number of passbooks should be issued. SB 46 should be sent by the registered post and the RL receipts should be filed along with IR report.
(e) IR should be issued within 10 days from the date of inspection.
(f) As far as possible, stop gap arrangement in respect of BPMs, the incumbent should be changed once in two months.
(g) Any error book entries regarding SB branch matters and any information from the Account Office regarding integrity of the BPMs should not be ignored. It should be verified through Mail overseers.
E. HOW TO CONTROL FRAUDS IN SUB OFFICES?
I. FRAUDULENT USE OF DATA ENTRY:
(a) Fraudulent use of Data Entry is the main factor in the frauds of Sub Offices. Data Entry is available in many offices without authorisation of Divisional Office. DSMs should be instructed to install Data Entry for specific period. DSM should uninstall Data Entry as soon as the purpose is served. Inspecting Officer should check whether Data Entry is available and if so, the purpose for which Data Entry is kept.
Method to check whether Data Entry is available in the system
Click Start -> Search -> For Files & Folders
Select ‘Computer’ (or all the Drives viz., C:\, D:\, E:\ F:\ etc., may be searched)
Search “ *dataentv5.exe ”
If data entry packages available, then the result will be
sbdataentv5.exe
rddataentv5.exe
tddataentv5.exe
misdataentv5.exe
scsdataentv5.exe
ppfdataentv5.exe
nssdataentv5.exe
certdataentv5.exe
If data entry packages are not available, then the result will be
No items match your search.
(b) Now a days, the fraudulent SPMs made forgery / fraudulent part withdrawals in RD accounts. Normally number of part withdrawals in a sub office is five percent of total RD accounts. If there are a large number of part withdrawals in a year, it should be suspected.
Method to check particulars of part withdrawals within a period
Login →Counter or Super (Enter button must be used instead of mouse)
Reports → RD Reports → Accounting of loans
Please enter from date and to date and Click ‘OK’
Account number, amount and date of withdrawals will be shown in the screen for
the given period. If there is any abnormal number of withdrawals noticed, passbooks of high value denomination should be obtained and verified whether there are any part withdrawals in the RD passbooks.
(c) (i) Initially once works relating to the Data Entry is completed after computerization, List of balances should be taken and certified by the SPM. The signed copy should be forwarded to concerned SBCO. SBCO should do the ledger agreement for that SO. DE should be removed by DSM and it should not be installed / used once again at any cost.
(ii) The SPM should request the Divisional office for Data Entry stating the particulars of accounts to be modified and reason for such request. After getting written permission from the Divisional Office with period of permission, the DSM should install the Data Entry Module for that particular scheme.
(iii) A register in the following format should be maintained in all Computerised POs., which should be reviewed by the Sub Divisional Heads during inspections/visits.
Sl. No
Date
Scheme
Account No.
Nature of Problem
Rectified through DE on (date)
Rectified by (Name of the official)
Sign. of the official
Sign of SPM/ HPM
(iii)After completion of works for which Data Entry is given, the data entry module should be removed/un-installed by the DSM.
(iv) 100% completion of works relating to Data Entry is the only way to avoid frauds in a sub office.
(d) During the visit or inspection, the Inspecting Officer should check whether unauthorised Data Entry is available. If unauthorised Data Entry is available, the Data Entry should be deleted. If we ordinarily delete the file, it will go to ‘RECYCLE BIN’. The Data Entry can be used restoring from RECYCLE BIN, If we use ‘SHIFT + DELETE’, the file will be deleted without going to Recycle Bin.
(e) The register maintained for Data entry modifications should be critically reviewed by the Sub Divisional Heads w.r.t the written permission accorded by the Divisional Heads and the details of accounts modified / corrected.
II. Supervision by the Sub Divisional head and inspectorial staff:
(a) An office should be inspected within a year. If the office could not be inspected within a year, the reason for the delay should be noted in the Inspection Report as well as in the diary.
(b) Inspecting Officer should give more importance in respect of paragraphs relating to verification of passbooks than any other paragraphs. These paragraphs find important role in fixing contributory negligence when the amount could not be recovered from the delinquent SPMs.
(c) As per latest Sub Office questionnaire, the following passbooks should be verified in respect of single sub offices.
(i) Fifteen SB passbooks which were not received for entry of interest (ii) Ten TD passbooks.
(d) Inspectorial staff may verify the following passbooks in addition to the above passbooks.
(i) Ten SB passbooks in which heavy deposits /heavy withdrawals were
made.
(ii) Five RD current passbooks.
(iii) Five RD discontinued passbooks.
(iv) Five MIS passbooks
(v) Five RPLI premium receipt books.
(d) If required number of passbooks could not be verified for any reason, SB 46 to the equal number of passbooks should be issued. SB 46 should be sent by the registered post and the RL receipts should be filed along with IR report.
(e) IR should be issued within 15 days from the date of inspection.
For kind attention of OAs, Postal Divisional Office and concerned supervisor whether ASPOs (HQ) or ASPOs (OD):
When a Sub Postmaster commits a fraud, the Circle Level Investigation of the Region will analyse all lapses on the part of the Head office, Sub Divisional head and Divisional office. They will fix contributory negligence, if any lapses are noticed on the part of the OA Divisional office and concerned supervisor.
A. Review of Sub Postmaster’s Monthly Report (SMR):
The following points should be reviewed in respect of SMRs.
(1) SMR should be prepared in correct format of PA 17 (a). In the reverse side, the transactions of the current month and the transactions of corresponding month of the last year of in respect of each branch should be noted. If the decrease in the transactions of SB and RD deposits and increase in the withdrawals should be reviewed critically. If such irregularities are noticed, SMR should be sent to the Sub Divisional head for verification.
(2) Now a days, Sub office monthly reports are sent instead of SMRs. It does not contain the transactions of the corresponding month of the previous year. It should not be accepted. The SPM should be asked to send SMR in correct form PA 17(a).
(3) There should be specific remarks in the SMRs by the Head Postmaster whether ‘Satisfactory’ or Not satisfactory’. Serious note should be taken on the remarks of the Head Postmaster such as ‘Not satisfactory’. Such SMRs should be sent to the Sub Divisional heads without fail. Watch should be made in respect of SMRs sent for verification.
(4) Serial numbers of the ECB memos should be noted in the SMRs. Continuity of ECB serial numbers should be watched.
(5) Generally the fraudulent SPMs do not send SMRs. They know that if SMRs are sent, they will be caught. Non receipt of SMRs from a Sub Postmaster should be reviewed seriously. Non receipt of SMRs should be watched by a register maintained for the purpose.
The following points should be reviewed in respect of ECB (Excess Cash Balance) memos: .
(1) There should be specific remarks in the ECB memos by the Head Postmaster whether ‘Satisfactory’ or Not satisfactory’. Serious note should be taken on the remarks of the Head Postmaster such as ‘Not satisfactory’. Such ECB memos should be sent to the Sub Divisional heads without fail. Watch should be made in respect of ECB memos sent for verification.
(2) Break in the serial numbers should be watched by maintaining a register each page for a Sub Office. If the break in serials is noticed, the SPM concerned should be addressed to send the wanting ECB memos with copy to the Head Postmaster. All correspondence should be made by the registered post.
Reviews of SMRs and ECB memos are tools to bring out the frauds. Many frauds are being unearthed by such reviews.
The following points should be reviewed in respect of IR branch:
1. In respect of Inspection Reports having the remarks ‘Not satisfactory’, the concerned BO or SO should be ear-marked for second inspection. Second inspection should be carried out during the next half year.
2. Serious note should be taken in respect of IR/VR paras in respect of irregularities relating to Savings Bank matters. Such paras should be communicated to the Sub Divisional heads or to some other Inspectorial staff immediately. Periodical reminders should be made.
3. In some divisional offices, no office copy is maintained for outward correspondences. It is not correct. All correspondence should be made by registered post by keeping office copies.
Compiled By
P.Karunanithy,B.Sc.,
ASPOs (HQ) ,
O/o The Supdt. of POs,
Karaikudi 630 003
Mobile : 094433 29681
Source : http://tnipasp.blogspot.in/
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